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Abstract
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mech-
anism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In
the α-classification problem we are interested in selecting the top α fraction of users. We give
upper bounds (impossibilities) and lower bounds (mechanisms) on the worst-case coincidence
between the classification of an IC mechanism and the ideal α-classification.
We prove bounds which depend on α and on the maximal number of reviews given by a single
agent, ∆. Our results show that it is harder to find a good mechanism when α is smaller and ∆
is larger. In particular, if ∆ is unbounded, then the best mechanism is trivial (that is, it does
not take into account the reviews). On the other hand, when ∆ is sublinear in the number of
agents, we give a simple, natural mechanism, with a coincidence ratio of α.
1 Introduction
There are many situations in which peer agents have binary, directed interactions with each other,
and in which one side can rate his experience from the interaction, or rather rate the other agent.
The following are just a few examples:
1. E-commerce sites in which buyers might also be sellers (e.g., ebay.com, amazon.com).
2. Academic paper reviewers for a conference might themselves be authors of papers submitted
to the same conference.
3. Employees in an organisation are sometime asked to fill out a sociometric overview of their
fellow friends.
In all of the above examples, a coordinator/manager is classifying the agents in the system according
to the reviews they received. In the e-commerce example, the top-rated sellers will appear higher
and more frequently in search results; the academic conference will only accept a certain top-
rated portion of the papers. Employees with higher sociometric results have better chances at a
promotion. A natural problem arises—in order to maximize one’s relative rating, it is a dominant
strategy in these situations to give a harsh critique to all interactions. In this paper, we model
the agents and their interactions as a directed network and ask whether it is possible to offer an
∗This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
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incentive-compatible (IC) mechanism to select a subset which represents the top-rated (“worthy”)
agents. We measure the quality of a mechanism as the resemblance between the selected set of
the mechanism and the set of top-rated agents, in the worst case. We investigate the relation
between the quality of the best possible mechanism to two parameters: (i) the maximal number of
reviews a single agent can issue (the maximal out-degree in the network, denoted ∆), and (ii) the
fastidiousness of the system (the relative size of the selected set, denoted α).
1.1 Our contribution
In this paper we investigate the existence of an α-classification IC mechanism in weighted networks.
Weighted networks without any limitation were not considered before as a framework for selection
mechanisms ([9] considered only ∆-regular weighted networks; the assumption of ∆-regularity
somewhat simplifies the optimisation criterion since in this case the optimisation for average in-
weights is equivalent to the optimisation for the sum of in-weights.). The most significant novelty of
our model is the consideration of mechanisms which classify the agents to “worthy” and “unworthy”,
in contrast to previous works which only considered k-subset selection (k-selection) mechanisms.
Our optimisation criterion is the coincidence between the mechanism’s classification and the ideal
classification. The difference from k-selection is two-fold. First, we do not know the exact size
of the set which we need to select. Second, we try to select as many of the right (truly worthy)
agents and not the wrong agents regardless of how high their in-degree is; this is very different from
k-selection, which just looks for a subset with high in-degree (even if it is completely disjoint to
the optimal subset).
We prove upper and lower bounds on the quality of the best possible IC classification mechanism.
We chart the behaviour of these bounds as a function of ∆ and α. We show that as ∆ grows (agents
are allowed to review many others), the possibility of an IC classification mechanism narrows down
until for large values of ∆ the best mechanism is one of the two trivial mechanisms: select all the
agents as worthy, or select every agent independently with probability 1/2. We show the reverse
behaviour with α: as we lower α (the system is more picky about its worthy-classified agents), the
quality of the best possible IC classification mechanism decays to zero.
On the other hand, for fixed α and for ∆ which is negligible with respect to the number of agents,
we provide a mechanism with a positive quality. The idea behind this mechanism is based on
a well-known practice to partition the agents into three subsets: absolutely worthy, borderline,
and absolutely unworthy. Unlike the well-known practice, our mechanism suggests to classify an
agent into these categories after ignoring his reviews on others. This makes the mechanism IC, but
complicates the performance analysis of the mechanism.
Previous works (e.g. [1], [9]) showed the existence of an optimal k-selection mechanisms when k is
large (say k = ω(1) or k = ω(∆) with regard to the number of agents). As explained above, these
mechanisms only select a k-subset of agents with high in-degree, while an α-classification mechanism
needs to select as many of worthy agents and not unworthy agents. This extra predicament shows
in the results as we bound the quality of any IC mechanism away from 1 (i.e., for any α < 1 there
is no ideal IC classification mechanism). This also shows the significance of our mechanism which,
under reasonable assumptions, selects not only good agents but the right agents.
The graphs in Figure 1 summarize our main findings. Graph (a) shows our bounds on the
quality of any IC mechanism as a function of α when ∆ is negligible with respect to the number
of agents. The grey dashed line is the ideal mechanism. The upper bound (red line) shows that
for any α < 1, there is a gap between the best possible mechanism and the ideal mechanism, and
this disparity is larger for lower values of α. The blue line denotes the quality of our proposed
mechanism, and so the green area is what we know about the possible value of the quality of the
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best IC mechanism. Graph (b) shows the quality of any IC mechanism as a function of α when ∆
is not bounded. Here the upper and lower bounds coincide to a single line, that is, we know what
is the best possible quality for any value of α.
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Figure 1: Our bounds for the quality of an IC classification mechanism as a function of α. In (a)
∆ = o(n). The red/blue graphs denote our upper/lower bounds and the green area denotes the
known feasible quality range. In (b) ∆ = n − 1. The single green graph is the quality of any IC
mechanism.
1.2 Related work
There have been in the past decade quite a few works on IC (sometimes called strategyproof or
impartial) selection mechanisms in networks. The most similar model to ours is [9]. In that paper
the authors considered the k-selection in a weighted ∆-regular network (that is, every agent has ∆
out-edges and ∆ in-edges), where k and ∆ are constants. They considered IC mechanisms which
try to optimize the average in-weights of the selected set. Their main result is a probabilistic
mechanism which is optimal when ∆ is negligible with respect to k.
Other papers on this subject only consider unweighted networks, which can be seen as a special
case of the weighted networks with weights in {0, 1}. These works can be divided into two flavours:
(a) Optimisation works which try to optimize the total in-degree of the selected agent or set of
agents. Examples of this group are [1, 7, 5, 6]. Another example is [4] in which the authors
try to optimize the progeny of the selected agent. These works differ in several parameters
of the problem, such as deterministic/probabilistic mechanisms; exact selection (selected set
must be of size k) or inexact selection (selected set is of size at most k); and the sub-family
of networks considered (all networks/m-regular networks/acyclic networks/etc.).
(b) Axiomatic works which define a set of axioms and investigate the possibility/impossibility of
mechanisms that fulfil maximal subsets of these axioms. Examples of this group are [8, 10, 3].
In [2] the authors considered the possibility of complete ranking mechanisms under certain
axioms.
Paper organization. In Section 2, we formally present our model and main results. In Section 3,
we prove our impossibility (upper bound) propositions (Propositions 10 and 11). These proofs rely
on an extension of our model to a symmetric, probabilistic mechanism; this extension is formally
defined in the beginning of Section 3. In Section 4, we present and prove a mechanism with a pos-
itive quality when the number of reviews of a single agent is negligible with respect to the number
of agents (Proposition 12). In Section 5, we conclude and discuss our results.
3
2 Model and main results
Let N = [n] be a set of n agents.1 We represent the interactions between the agents as a directed
graph, G(N,E); thus an edge (x, y) means that agent x interacted with agent y and is allowed to
review this agent. Let Ein(x), Eout(x) be the sets of in-edges and out-edges of x, respectively. We
assume that each agent in the network is in control of the weights of his outgoing edges. These
weights, which are real numbers in the interval [-1,1],2 represent the reviews of the source agent
for the target agents. Thus, the reviews of agent x ∈ N for his interactions are {we|e ∈ Eout(x)}.
After all agents submitted reviews on their interactions,3 we get a weighted, directed graph; from
now on we assume all the edges of G are weighted.
Based on the reviews that agent x received, {we|e ∈ Ein(x)}, we define his score and his relative
ranking in the system. The score of agent x is the average of weights on Ein(x):
s(x,G) =


∑
e∈Ein(x)
we
|Ein(x)|
, Ein(x) 6= ∅,
0, Ein(x) = ∅.
(1)
The ranking of agent x is the number of agents who strictly have a better score than him: r(x,G) =
|{y ∈ N |s(y,G) > s(x,G)}|.4 For a given real parameter α ∈ (0, 1) we consider as worthy the subset
of agents who are in the top α-ranking:5
Iα(G) = {x ∈ N |r(x) < αn }.
Notice that the size of Iα(G) is at least αn, but might be higher in case of ties. For instance, in the
empty graph, Iα(G(N, ∅)) = N for all α. We denote by Iα(G) = N\Iα(G), the subset of unworthy
agents.
Our goal is to offer an IC mechanism which selects a set which is as similar as possible to the subset
of worthy agents. Formally, let G(n) be the family of all [-1,1]-weighted, directed networks on n
nodes and let P (N) be the power set of N .
Definition 1. A classification mechanism is a function M : G(n)→ P (N).
The setM(G) is the subset of agents which the mechanismM classifies as worthy in the network
G. We denote by M(G) = N\M(G) the subset classified as unworthy by the mechanism. Notice
that the definition of a mechanism depends on n through its dependence on G(n) and N . We abuse
notation and regard a single mechanism M as if it represents a series of mechanisms—one for every
natural n.
The IC requirement means that an agent’s classification is not influenced by his own reviews; that
is, changing the weights on the out-edges of an agent does not alter his classification.
Definition 2. A classification mechanism M is incentive-compatible if for every n ∈ N, G,G′ ∈
G(n), x ∈ N , such that: E(G) = E(G′) and ∀e ∈ E\Eout(x), we(G) = we(G
′),
x ∈M(G) ⇐⇒ x ∈M(G′).
1We assume n is large as we are generally interested in results which are asymptotic in n. For the same reason
we habitually drop floors and ceilings for easier reading.
2A review of ‘0’ is the neutral review. For example, an agent with all-zero in-edges is rated in the same way as an
agent with no in-edges (see the definition of s(·) in (1)).
3We can set a zero-weight on all interactions which were not reviewed (see Footnote 2), hence we may assume
w.l.o.g. that all interactions have been reviewed.
4From now on, when G is clear from the context, we just write s(x), r(x).
5We think of α as the selectiveness of the system: a lower value for α means that the tag of being worthy is more
prestigious.
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To define a measure for the quality of the mechanism, we first define a measure of coincidence
between M(G) and Iα(G):
C(M(G), Iα(G)) =
1
n
∑
x∈N
{
1, x ∈ (M(G) ∩ Iα(G)) ∪ (M (G) ∩ Iα(G)),
−1, otherwise.
(2)
In other words, C(M(G), Iα(G) gives one point for every agent that M(G) classified correctly and
takes one point for every agent which was classified erroneously; the result is normalised by the
number of agents.6 This measure can be somewhat simplified to get,7
C(M(G), Iα(G)) =
1
n
(|((M(G) ∩ Iα(G)) ∪ (M (G) ∩ Iα(G)))| − |M(G) ⊕ Iα(G)|)
=
1
n
(|N\(M(G) ⊕ Iα(G))| − |M(G) ⊕ Iα(G)|) = 1−
2
n
|M(G) ⊕ Iα(G)|.
Our main theorems imply that the possibility of an IC mechanism which guarantees a fixed
level of coincidence depends on two parameters. The first is α. The second is the maximal out-
degree in the network (i.e., the maximal reviews an agent can issue), denoted by ∆. Intuitively,
if ∆ is high, then an unworthy agent might use his influence on the score of ∆ worthy agents to
improve his ranking and be considered worthy. If α is relatively low, then these manipulations
might influence a large portion (or all) of the worthy-classified agents, which makes it harder to
find an IC mechanism with high coincidence measure. Our results will show that this intuition is
indeed correct. Let G(n,∆) be the family of all networks on n nodes with maximal out-degree ∆.
The quality of a mechanism for given α,∆, is the limit when n goes to infinity of the worst case of
the coincidence measure:
Qα,∆(M) = lim
n→∞
min
G∈G(n,∆)
C(M(G), Iα(G)). (3)
We will prove upper and lower bounds on Qα,∆ for any IC classification mechanism.
2.1 Main results
We start by defining two trivial IC mechanisms. ‘Trivial’ means that they classify the nodes without
any regard to the edges’ weights.
Let MN be the complete mechanism, i.e., MN (G) = N for all G ∈ G(n).
Proposition 3. For any α,∆, Qα,∆(MN ) = 2α− 1.
Proof. Since |N ⊕ Iα(G)| = |Iα(G)| = n− |Iα(G)| ≤ n(1− α), we get that for any graph,
C(MN (G), Iα(G)) = 1−
2
n
|N ⊕ Iα(G)| ≥ 1−
2n(1 − α)
n
= 2α − 1.
6Other measures might be appropriate for different applications. We discuss two of these alternatives in Section 5.
The main conclusions from our results stay the same in these variations.
7The operator ⊕ is the “exclusive or”.
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Our second trivial mechanism, M1/2, selects every node to be worthy with probability 1/2,
independently. We use here the concept of a probabilistic mechanism intuitively; in the beginning
of Section 3, we formally extend our model to include this kind of mechanism. Mechanism M1/2
correctly classifies nodes x with probability 1/2, hence Qα,∆(M1/2) = 0 for all α,∆.
Our first result is a strong impossibility, saying that when ∆ is large, one of the two trivial mech-
anisms is the best possible.
Theorem 4.
(a) For α ≥
1
2
and ∆ ≥ 2(1 − α)n, Qα,∆ = 2α− 1.
(b) For α <
1
2
and ∆ = (1− o(1))n, Qα,∆ = 0.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 3, our observation for M1/2 and Proposition 11.
Our second result is a non-trivial, yet quite natural, mechanism with a better quality than the
complete mechanism, provided ∆ = o(n). The idea behind this mechanism is to recognize three
subsets of agents: absolutely worthy, absolutely unworthy, and borderline. The first two subsets
contain those agents who will not be able to change their classification, no matter what their
reviews will be. The fact that ∆ is negligible guarantees that the absolutely worthy and absolutely
unworthy sets will include a large portion of the true worthy and unworthy subsets, respectively.
The mechanism then classifies the absolutely worthy agents as worthy and the absolutely unworthy
as unworthy. If we allow the mechanism to be probabilistic, we can select each of the borderline
agents to be worthy with probability 1/2; this strategy assures that these agents will not hurt the
quality (but will not help it either). We also provide a deterministic version of this mechanism which
always classifies correctly almost half of the borderline agents. The following theorem summarises
our knowledge when ∆ = o(n).
Theorem 5. For any α and ∆ = o(n), α ≤ Qα,∆ =
1
2
(1 + α).
Proof. The lower bound comes from an analysis of the above-described probabilistic mechanism;
see Proposition 13. We also prove the existence of a deterministic version of this mechanism in
Proposition 12. The upper bound is proved in Proposition 10.
3 Impossibilities
As promised, we start by extending our model to include probabilistic mechanisms. A probabilistic
mechanism assigns each node a probability of being worthy.
Definition 6. A probabilistic classification mechanism is a function Mp : N × G(n)→ [0, 1].
To get a concrete selected set from a probabilistic mechanism, we select each node independently
with his assigned probability. In other words, the probability of subset X ⊆ N to be selected under
mechanism Mp in the graph G is
Pr[X|Mp(G)] =
∏
x∈X
Mp(x,G)
∏
x/∈X
(1−Mp(x,G)). (4)
The IC requirement translates to the requirement that an agent cannot influence his own selection
probability.
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Definition 7. A probabilistic classification mechanism Mp is incentive-compatible if for every
n ∈ N, G,G′ ∈ G(n), x ∈ N , such that: E(G) = E(G′) and ∀e ∈ E\Eout(x), we(G) = we(G
′),
Mp(x,G) =Mp(x,G
′).
The coincidence of Mp(G) with Iα(G) is naturally extended using expectation over the selected
set:
C(Mp(G), Iα(G)) =
∑
X∈P (N)
Pr[X|Mp(G)]C(X, Iα(G))
=
1
n
∑
X∈P (N)
Pr[X|Mp(G)] ·
∑
x∈N
{
1, x ∈ (X ∩ Iα(G)) ∪ (X ∩ Iα(G))
−1, otherwise.
Changing the summation order and inserting (4) we get,
C(Mp(G), Iα(G)) =
1
n
∑
x∈N
∑
X∈P (N\{x})
∏
y∈N\{x}
{
Mp(y,G), y ∈ X
1−Mp(y,G), y /∈ X
·
{
Mp(x,G)− (1−Mp(x,G)), x ∈ Iα(G)
(1−Mp(x,G)) −Mp(x,G), x ∈ Iα(G).
Since
∑
X∈P (N\{x})
∏
y∈N\{x}
{
Mp(y,G), y ∈ X
1−Mp(y,G), y /∈ X
= 1,
C(Mp(G), Iα(G)) =
1
n
∑
x∈N
(2Mp(x,G)− 1) ·
{
1, x ∈ Iα(G)
−1, x ∈ Iα(G)
(5)
=
Iα(G)− Iα(G)
n
+
2
n
∑
x∈N
Mp(x,G) ·
{
1, x ∈ Iα(G)
−1, x ∈ Iα(G).
(6)
The quality of a probabilistic mechanism can now be defined exactly as in (3):
Qα,∆(Mp) = lim
n→∞
min
G∈G(n,∆)
C(Mp(G), Iα(G)).
From Definitions 6 and 7 and the coincidence definition above, it is clear that the IC (deterministic)
mechanisms for which we initially defined our problem are a special case of IC probabilistic mech-
anisms. Hence we may prove our upper bounds (i.e., impossibilities) for probabilistic mechanisms.
We furthermore show that it is enough to consider a subfamily of symmetric, IC, probabilistic
mechanisms.
Definition 8. A probabilistic mechanism Mp is symmetric if for any network G ∈ G(n) and two
isomorphic nodes x, y ∈ N , Mp(x,G) =Mp(y,G).
Claim 9. Let Mp be any IC, probabilistic, classification mechanism. Then there is an IC, symmet-
ric, probabilistic classification mechanism M ′p with Qα,∆(M
′
p) ≥ Qα,∆(Mp).
Proof. Let S(N) be the set of permutations over N . For π ∈ S(N), let Gpi be the graph which is
isomorphic to G under the automorphism defined by π. We define the mechanism M ′p:
M ′p(x,G) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈S(N)
Mp(π(x), Gpi). (7)
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Mechanism M ′p is clearly IC, since Mp is IC and otherwise the calculation above is irrelevant of any
of the weights in G. It is also symmetric, since for two isomorphic nodes, x, y, the following two
sets of the couples are exactly the same:
{(π(x), Gpi)|π ∈ S(N)} = {(π(y), Gpi)|π ∈ S(N)}.
It remains to show that the quality of M ′p is at least that of Mp. Planting (6) into (7) and
changing the summation order we get that for any G,
C(M ′p(G), Iα(G)) =
Iα(G)− Iα(G)
n
+
2
n · n!
∑
x∈N
∑
pi∈S(N)
Mp(π(x), Gpi) ·
{
1, x ∈ Iα(Gpi)
−1, x ∈ Iα(Gpi)
=
Iα(G)− Iα(G)
n
+
1
n!
∑
pi∈S(N)
[
2
n
∑
x∈N
Mp(π(x), Gpi) ·
{
1, x ∈ Iα(Gpi)
−1, x ∈ Iα(Gpi)
.
]
Let Q = Qα,∆(Mp). For any ǫ > 0, there is n0 such that for all n > n0 and for all G ∈ G(n,∆),
C(Mp(G, Iα(G))) ≥ Q− ǫ, which means that
2
n
∑
x∈N
Mp(x,G) ·
{
1, x ∈ Iα(G)
−1, x ∈ Iα(G)
≥ Q− ǫ−
Iα(G) − Iα(G)
n
.
Hence, C(M ′p(G), Iα(G)) ≥ Q− ǫ. Since this is true for any ǫ, we get that Qα,∆(M
′
p) ≥ Q.
We are now ready to prove our two impossibility propositions which imply the upper bounds
of Theorems 4 and 5.
Proposition 10. For all α,∆, Qα,∆ ≤
1
2
(1 + α).
Proof. Let v be a distinct node. Partition N\{v} into three sets, A,B,C, of sizes
(1− α)n
2
,
(1− α)n
2
, αn−
1, respectively. Let G be the network in which every node in A ∪ B has an out-edge to v, and
C is a cycle. Set the weights on the edges from A to v to be 1, the weights on the edges from
B to v to be −1 +
1
(1 − α)n
, and the weights on C to be 1. For any a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C their
scores are: s(c) = 1, s(a) = s(b) = 0, and s(v) =
|A|+ |B|(−1 + 1/(1 − α)n)
|A|+ |B|
=
1
2(1 − α)n
> 0.
Hence Iα(G) = C ∪ {v}. Let M be an IC, probabilistic and symmetric classification mechanism.
By symmetry, we may denote M(a,G) = µ for any a ∈ A. Using (5) we get that,
C(M(G), Iα(G)) ≤
1
n
((1 − 2µ)|A|+ |B|+ |C|+ 1) = 1− µ(1− α). (8)
Now choose a distinct node a0 ∈ A and change the weight on its out-edge to v to be −1+
1
(1− α)n
;
we refer to this network as G′. The score of v has dropped in
2− 1/(1 − α)n
|A|+ |B|
=
2− 1/(1 − α)n
(1− α)n
>
1
2(1− α)n
, for n large enough. Hence s(v,G′) < 0. Since the rest of the scores are the same in
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G and G′, we get that Iα(G
′) = N\{v}. By IC, M(a0, G
′) = M(a0, G) = µ, and by symmetry
M(b,G′) = µ for any b ∈ B. We now get ,
C(M(G′), Iα(G
′)) ≤
1
n
(|A| + (2µ− 1)|B|+ C + 1) = 1− (1− µ)(1− α) = α+ µ(1− α). (9)
From (8) and (9), Qα,∆ ≤ min{1− µ(1− α), α + µ(1− α)}. Comparing the two terms to find the
optimal value for µ we find that
1− µ(1− α) = α+ µ(1− α) ⇐⇒ µ =
1
2
=⇒ Qα,∆ ≤ 1−
1− α
2
=
1 + α
2
.
Proposition 11. Let m = min
{
2(1 − α),
∆
n
}
. Then Qα,∆ ≤ 1−m.
Proof. Consider two cases:
Case I: m ≥ 2α.
Let A,B ⊆ N be two disjoint subsets of size nm/2. Let G be the graph in which A ∪ B is a
clique and there are no other edges. We set the weights on all the out-edges of nodes in A to be
0, and the weights on all the out-edges of nodes in B to be 1. Hence every a ∈ A has a score of
s(a) =
|B|
|A ∪B|
, every b ∈ B has a score of s(b) =
|B| − 1
|A ∪B|
and the score of every c /∈ A ∪ B is 0.
Since |A| =
mn
2
≥ αn, Iα(G) = A. Let M be an IC, probabilistic, symmetric mechanism. By the
symmetry of M , all the vertices of B get the same probability. Denote it µ. Let b be a distinct
vertex in B. Let G′ be the graph we get when we nullify all the weights on the outgoing edges of b.
Since b is now isomorphic to the vertices in A, we get by IC and the symmetry of M that ∀a ∈ A,
M(a,G′) =M(b,G′) =M(b,G) = µ. We see that there is a trade-off in the value of µ; on the one
hand, we need it to be high if we want a good quality on G′, but on the other hand, it needs to
be low for a good quality on G. The idea of the proof is that for n large enough, we can repeat
this process and show that in essence all the vertices in A∪B in the graph G (or at least in one of
the graphs we get from G after a negligible number of steps) should have approximately the same
probability. This implies that
Qα,∆ ≤
1
n
(|A|(2µ − 1) + |B|(1− 2µ) + |N\(A ∪B)|) =
2µ − 1
n
(|A| − |B|) + 1−
|A ∪B|
n
= 1−m.
To make this claim precise, suppose for contradiction that Qα,∆(M) ≥ 1 −m + ǫ for some ǫ > 0.
For k ≤ X, X to be found, we let Ak, Bk ⊆ N be two disjoint subsets with sizes |Ak| = mn/2 + k,
|Bk| = mn/2−k. Define the graph Gk in which Ak∪Bk is a clique, and the weights on the outgoing
edges of vertices in Ak are all 0, and the weights on the outgoing edges of vertices in Bk are all 1.
Notice the following:
a) The vertices in Ak are symmetric, and so are the vertices in Bk.
b) Iα(G
k) = Ak.
c) If we nullify the outgoing edges of one of the nodes b ∈ Bk then we get the graph Gk+1in
which b ∈ Ak+1.
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By the symmetry ofM , we may denote for any k, µka =M(a,G
k) for all a ∈ Ak, and µkb =M(b,G
k)
for all b ∈ Bk. By (c) and IC of M , µkb = µ
k+1
a . By the assumption on the quality of M :
1
n
(|Ak|(2µka − 1) + |B
k|(1 − 2µkb ) + |N\(A
k ∪Bk)|) ≥ 1−m+ ǫ,
1
n
((mn/2 + k)(2µka − 1) + (mn/2− k)(1− 2µ
k
b ) + (1−m)n) ≥ 1−m+ ǫ,
(mn+ 2k)µka − (mn− 2k)µ
k
b − 2k ≥ ǫn.
Summing up this inequality for 0 ≤ k ≤ X and substituting µkb for µ
k+1
a we get,
mnµ0a − (mn− 2X)µ
X
b + 2
X∑
k=1
(2k − 1)µka −X(X + 1) ≥ Xǫn.
Let µmax = max
1≤k≤X
µka. IfX = o(n), then for n large enoughmn ≥ 2X. We strengthen the inequality
by removing the negative terms on the left-hand side, and replacing all the µka with µmax:
µmax
(
mn+ 2
X∑
k=1
(2k − 1)
)
≥ Xǫn
µmax(mn+ 2X
2) ≥ Xǫn
=⇒ µmax ≥
ǫX
m+ 2X2/n
.
Now taking X = 2m/ǫ we get that for n large enough µmax > 1, which is a contradiction.
Case II: m < 2α
The proof is very similar. We define three subsets, A,B,C of size nm/2, nm/2 and (α −m/2)n,
respectively.8 Let G be the graph in which A∪B is a clique and C is a cycle. Again we set all the
weights on the out-edges of the nodes in A to be 0, and weights on all the out-edges of nodes in B
to be 1. The edges in the cycle in C also get a weight of 1. Thus now s(c) = 1 > s(a) > s(b) for any
c ∈ C, a ∈ A, b ∈ B. Since |A ∪ C| = αn, we have Iα(G) = A ∪ C. Let M be an IC, probabilistic,
symmetric mechanism. Using the same technique as before, we get that all the vertices in A ∪ B
should get the same probability, which we call µ. Since Iα(G) = A ∪ C we can bound as before:
Qα,∆(M) ≤
1
n
(|A|(2µ − 1) + |B|(1− 2µ) + |N\(A ∪B)|) = 1−m.
The formal argument is precisely the same.
4 Non-trivial mechanism
In this section we show the existence of a mechanism with quality α, provided ∆ = o(n). Specifically,
we will show the following:
Proposition 12. For any α and any ∆ ≤ min{13αn,
1
3(1 − α)n}, there is an IC classification
mechanism with quality α−
3∆
n
.
8Since we assume m < 2α, |C| > 0.
10
For better exposition, we start by presenting a probabilistic mechanism which is slightly better.
Proposition 13. For any α and any ∆ ≤ αn, there is an IC probabilistic classification mechanism
with quality α−
∆
n
.
For a graph G and x ∈ G, denote by Gx the graph we get when we set all the weights on the
out-edges of x to be -1. Let β = α−
∆
n
. The idea is to partition N into three subsets:
W (G) = {x ∈ N |x ∈ Iβ(Gx)},
U(G) = {x ∈ N |x ∈ Iα(Gx)},
B(G) = N\(W ∪ U) = {x ∈ N |x ∈ Iα(Gx)\Iβ(Gx)}.
Notice that the definitions of W,U,B are IC, in the sense that the sorting of x to one of these sets
does not depend on his own reviews (since we fixed all his reviews to -1 before choosing his set). If
x ∈W , then his ranking in Gx is less than βn: r(x,Gx) < βn. The real reviews of x may increase
the score of at most ∆ agents, which means that r(x,G) ≤ r(x,Gx) + ∆ < βn + ∆ = αn; hence
x ∈ Iα(G). We have proved that W ⊆ Iα(G). We think of W as the absolutely worthy agents.
Similarly, the set U is the set of absolutely unworthy agents: for x ∈ U , r(x,G) ≥ r(x,Gx) ≥ αn
(increasing his reviews can only hurt his relative ranking), and U ⊆ Iα(G). The set B contains all
the borderline agents: these are the agents which we are not sure how to classify. We define the
following probabilistic mechanism:
Mp(x,G) =


1, x ∈W (G),
0, x ∈ U(G),
1/2, x ∈ B(G).
Since W,U,B are IC, this mechanism is IC. The mechanism is always correct in the classification
of the agents in W ∪ U . We set the probability of agents in B to be 1/2 so that the expected
contribution of the agents in B to the coincidence measure is zero. We get that for any G ∈ G(n,∆)
with ∆ ≤ αn,
C(Mp(G), Iα(G)) =
1
n
(|W (G)| + |U(G)|) ≥
|W (G)|
n
≥ β = α−
∆
n
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 13.
The idea for the deterministic mechanism is similar. This mechanism selects as worthy all the agents
in W and as unworthy all the agents in U . For the agents in B we need to find an IC, deterministic
way to classify them such that in every network about half of them are rightly classified. Notice
first that if |U | ≥ |B| − 2∆ then
C(M(G), Iα(G)) ≥
1
n
(|W |+ |U | − |B|) ≥
1
n
(βn− 2∆) = α−
3∆
n
.
Let L(B) be a linear ordering of B according to r(·, G) and breaking ties lexicographically.9 Let
B+ be the top half nodes in B according to L. For x ∈ B we denote by Bx the set B in Gx.
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Similarly, let B+x = B
+(Gx). We now complete our definition of mechanism M by setting for every
9That is, for x, y ∈ B, x ≻L y ⇐⇒ (r(x) > r(y)) ∨ ((r(x) = r(y)) ∧ (x < y)).
10To be clear, for x, y ∈ N , let Gx,y be the graph in which we set all the weights on the outgoing edges of x and y
to -1. Then Bx(G) = B(Gx) = {y ∈ N |y ∈ Iα(Gx,y)\Iβ(Gx,y)}.
11
x ∈ B, x ∈ M(G) ⇐⇒ x ∈ B+x . That is, x ∈ B is accepted if and only if it is ranked in the
top half of Bx when breaking ties lexicographically. The mechanism does not use the weights on
the outgoing edges of x to determine its classification, hence it is IC. We complete the proof of
Proposition 12 with the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Suppose that ∆ ≤
1
3
(1−α)n. For any graph G ∈ G(n,∆) with |U | < |B|−2∆ at least
1
2
(|B ∪ U | −∆) of the agents in B ∪ U are classified correctly.
Using this lemma we get that for any such graph,
C(M(G), Iα(G)) ≥
1
n
(
|W |+
1
2
(|B ∪ U | −∆)−
1
2
(|B ∪ U |+∆)
)
≥
1
n
(|W | −∆) ≥
1
n
(βn−∆) = α−
2∆
n
,
as required.
Proof of Lemma 14. Consider two cases.
Case I: |Iα(G)| ≥ αn+ 2∆.
In this case B ⊆ Iα\Iβ , since if x /∈ Iα(G), then in Gx there are at least |Iα| −∆ ≥ αn+∆ agents
with a higher score than s(x); hence x /∈ Iα(Gx). Moreover, for any x ∈ B, Bx ⊆ Iα(G), since for
any y /∈ Iα, there are in Gx,y at least |Iα| − 2∆ ≥ αn agents with a higher score than s(y). Let B
∗
be the top 12(|B| −∆) ranked agents in B according to L(B). We claim that the agents in B
∗ are
all classified by our mechanism to be worthy, which is the correct classification (since B ⊂ Iα(G),
as explained). The reason is that when we set the weight on an edge (x, y) with x ∈ B∗ to -1,
we add at most one agent to B which is ranked above x (this might happen when y ∈ W ), or we
remove at most one agent from B which is ranked below x (this might happen when y ∈ B and is
ranked below him). Thus x must be in the top-half ranked agents in Bx. Since all the agents in U
are correctly classified, we get that at least |B∗|+ |U | = 12(|B|+ 2|U | −∆) are classified correctly.
Case II: |Iα(G)| < αn+ 2∆.
Let B∗ be the bottom
1
2(|B| − |U |)−∆ ranked agents in B according to L(B).
11 Since |B∗ ∪U | =
1
2(|B|+ |U |)−∆ ≤
1
2 (1− β)n−∆ =
1
2 (1−α)n−
1
2∆, and |Iα(G)| = n− Iα(G) > (1−α)n− 2∆ ≥
1
2(1 − α)n −
1
2∆, we get that B∗ ⊆ Iα(G). It is therefore enough to show that for any x ∈ B∗,
x /∈ B+x . Indeed, lowering the weights on the out-edges of x can advance x in the ranking of B by
at most ∆ places (if the edges are to nodes in B that are ranked higher than x), and it might also
add all the nodes of U to |B|; in any case x will still be in the bottom half of Bx.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced a generic model for the classification of agents to worthy and unworthy accord-
ing to their own reviews of each other. We draw two general conclusions regarding the existence of
an IC classification mechanism:
1. If ∆ is large, there is no good mechanism in the sense that the best mechanisms do not take
into consideration the reviews.
2. If ∆ is negligible with respect to the number of agents, there is a mechanism with a positive
quality, but not with quality 1.
11Notice that |B∗| > 0 due to our assumption on |U |.
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Our measure for the coincidence between the selected set and the true worthy agents (2) assumes
that every classification/misclassification has the same value/price. In other applications it makes
more sense to consider only the classification/misclassification of the worthy agents, which leads to
the following measure:
C(M(G), Iα(G)) =
1
|Iα(G)|
∑
x∈M(G)
{
1, x ∈ Iα(G),
−1, x /∈ Iα(G).
Yet another measure might consider all the agents but normalise the classification/misclassification
of an agent according to his true set:12
C(M(G), Iα(G)) =
|M(G) ∩ Iα(G)|
2|Iα(G)|
+
|M(G) ∩ Iα(G)|
2|Iα(G)|
.
We mention here that using these measures does not change our two conclusions above; in other
words, our conclusions are intrinsic in the problem and not the result of a specific measure. The
exact claims and proofs can be found in Appendix A.
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A Two alternative measures
Consider the following two alternative coincidence measures and the appropriate quality measures.
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) =
1
|Iα(G)|
∑
x∈M(G)
{
1, x ∈ Iα(G)
−1, x /∈ Iα(G)
=
|M(G) ∩ Iα(G)| − |M(G) ∩ Iα(G)|
|Iα(G)|
.
Q′α,∆(Mp) = limn→∞
min
G∈G(n,∆)
C′(Mp(G), Iα(G)).
C′′(M(G), Iα(G)) =


|M(G) ∩ Iα(G)|
2|Iα(G)|
+
|M(G) ∩ Iα(G)|
2|Iα(G)|
, Iα(G) 6= ∅
|M(G)|
2n
+
1
2
, Iα(G) = ∅.
Q′′α,∆(Mp) = limn→∞
min
G∈G(n,∆)
C′′(Mp(G), Iα(G)).
In this appendix we prove upper and lower bounds on Q′α,∆ and Q
′′
α,∆ which lead to the following
graphs parallel to the graphs in Figure 1. Just as with Figure 1 (b), the mechanisms which give
the best qualities in Figure 2 (b) and Figure 3 (b) are trivial.
1
1
α
Q′
(a)
1
2
1
1
α
Q′
(b)
Figure 2: Our bounds for Q′α,∆ as a function of α when (a) ∆ = o(n) and (b) ∆ = n− 1.
1
1
2
7
8
1
α
Q′′
(a)
1
1
2
α
Q′′
(b)
Figure 3: Our bounds for Q′′α,∆ as a function of α when (a) ∆ = o(n) and (b) ∆ = n− 1.
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A.1 Bounds on Q′α,∆
To prove the lower bound of we define two trivial schemes: MN (G) ≡ N and M∅(G) ≡ ∅. For any
graph G,
C′(MN (G), Iα(G)) =
|N ∩ Iα(G)| − |N ∩ Iα(G)|
|Iα(G)|
= 1−
|Iα(G)|
|Iα(G)|
≥ 1−
1− α
α
= 2−
1
α
.
C′(M∅(G), Iα(G)) =
|∅ ∩ Iα(G)| − |∅ ∩ Iα(G)|
|Iα(G)|
= 0.
Thus when α ≤
1
2
we have a trivial mechanism with quality 0 and when α ≥
1
2
we have a trivial
mechanism with quality 2 −
1
α
, which is exactly the graphs in Figure 2 (b). The next proposition
proves that when ∆ = n− 1 there are no better mechanisms.
Proposition 15. Let m = min
{
2(1 − α),
∆
n
}
. Then Q′α,∆ ≤ max
{
1−
m
2α
, 0
}
.
To see how this proposition implies the upper bound of Figure 2 (b), take ∆ = n− 1 and notice
that
m =


1, α ≤
1
2
2(1 − α), α ≥
1
2
.
Hence, when α <
1
2
, 1 −
m
2α
= 1 −
1
2α
< 0 and Q′α,∆ ≤ 0. When α ≥
1
2
, 1 −
m
2α
= 1 −
1− α
α
=
2−
1
α
≥ 0, and Q′α,∆ ≤ 2−
1
α
.
Proof of Proposition 15. We analyse the same series of networks as in Proposition 11. We get for
Case I (m ≥ 2α):
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) ≤
µ|A| − µ|B|
|A|
= 0.
For Case II (m < 2α):
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) ≤
µ|A|+ |C| − µ|B|
|A|+ |C|
=
|C|
|A|+ |C|
=
α−m/2
α
= 1−
m
2α
.
Combining the two cases, we get the claimed bound on Q′α,∆.
The next proposition proved the upper bound in Figure 2 (a).
Proposition 16. For all α,∆, Q′α,∆ ≤
1 + 3α
2 + 2α
.
Proof. We use the same network structure of Proposition 10 and get:
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) ≤
|C|+ 1− µ|A|
|C|+ 1
= 1−
µ|A|
αn
.
C′(M(G′), Iα(G
′)) ≤
|A|+ µ|B|+ |C|+ 1
|N |
= 1−
(1− µ)|B|
n
.
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Comparing the two expression to get the highest minimum of the two:
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) = C
′(M(G′), Iα(G
′)) ⇐⇒
µ|A|
αn
=
(1− µ)|B|
n
⇐⇒
µ
α
= 1− µ ⇐⇒ µ =
α
1 + α
.
Hence,
Q′α,∆ ≤ 1−
|A|
(1 + α)n
= 1−
1− α
2(1 + α)
=
1 + 3α
2 + 2α
.
The next proposition in the lower bound of Figure 2 (a).
Proposition 17. For any α and any ∆ ≤ αn, there is an IC probabilistic classification mechanism
with quality α−
∆
n
.
Proof. Let β = α − ∆/n and let W (G) be the set of absolutely worthy agents as defined in the
proof of Proposition 13. We define mechanism M :
∀G ∈ G(n,∆)M(G) =W (G).
Then,
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) =
|W (G)|
|Iα(G)|
≥
βn
n
= β.
A.2 Bounds on Q′′α,∆
As a trivial mechanism we take MN (G) ≡ N . Clearly, C
′′(MN (G), Iα(G)) =
1
2
for all networks.
Proposition 18. For ∆ = n− 1 and any α, Q′′α,∆ ≤
1
2
.
Proof. Partition N into two sets A,B of sizes αn and (1−α)n, respectively. Let G be the complete
network in which the weights on the out-edges of nodes in A are 0, and the weights on the out-edge
of nodes in B are 1. Clearly, the nodes in A are symmetric and the nodes in B are symmetric.
The nodes in A have a better score than the nodes in B, hence Iα(G) = A. Let M be a symmetric
probabilistic mechanism. By similar argument to that in the proof of Proposition 11, we may
assume that all the nodes in the network are selected by M with the same probability, µ. We get,
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) =
µ|A|
2|A|
+
(1− µ)|B|
2|B|
=
1
2
.
This settles Figure 3 (b). We turn to the upper bound of Figure 3 (a).
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Proposition 19. For all α,∆, Q′α,∆ ≤
3
4
+
1
4(2− α)
.
Proof. We use the same network structure of Proposition 10 and get:
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) ≤
|C|+ 1
2(|C|+ 1)
+
(1− µ)|A|+ |B|
2(|A|+ |B|)
= 1−
µ|A|
2(|A| + |B|)
= 1−
µ
4
.
C′(M(G′), Iα(G
′)) ≤
|A|+ µ|B|+ |C|+ 1
2|N |
+
1
2
= 1−
(1− µ)|B|
2n
= 1−
(1− µ)(1− α)
4
.
Comparing the two expression to get the highest minimum of the two:
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) = C
′(M(G′), Iα(G
′)) ⇐⇒
µ = (1− µ)(1− α) ⇐⇒ µ =
1− α
2− α
.
Hence,
Q′α,∆ ≤ 1−
1− α
4(2 − α)
=
3
4
+
1
4(2− α)
.
The last proposition is the mechanism which gives the lower bound of Figure 3 (a).
Proposition 20. For any α and any ∆ ≤ αn, there is an IC probabilistic classification mechanism
with quality
1
2
(
1 + α−
∆
n
)
.
Proof. Let β = α − ∆/n and let W (G) be the set of absolutely worthy agents as defined in the
proof of Proposition 13. We define mechanism M :
∀G ∈ G(n,∆)M(G) =W (G).
Then,
C′(M(G), Iα(G)) ≥
|W (G)|
2|Iα(G)|
+
|B(G) ∩ Iα(G)| + |U(G)||
2|Iα(G)|
≥
βn
2n
+
1
2
=
1
2
(1 + β).
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